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 Differences in Prices and Price Risk Across
 Alternative Marketing Arrangements
 Used in the Fed Cattle Industry
 Mary K. Muth, Yanyan Liu, Stephen R. Koontz,
 and John D. Lawrence
 Information on prices and price risk differences across marketing arrangements aids
 fed cattle producers in making choices about marketing methods. As part of the
 congressionally mandated Livestock and Meat Marketing Study, we investigated fed
 cattle price and price risk differences across marketing arrangements. The analysis
 uses data representing cattle purchased by 29 large beef packing plants from October
 2002 through March 2005. Results indicate that marketing agreements offered the
 best tradeoff between price level and price risk. Forward contracts had the lowest
 average yet highly volatile prices. Auction barn prices were higher than other
 methods but also the most volatile.
 Key words: alternative marketing arrangements, fed cattle, hedonic, price risk, price
 volatility, prices
 Introduction
 In 2003, Congress allocated funds to conduct a broad study of the effects of alternative
 marketing arrangements (AMAs) in the livestock and meat industries. AMAs that result
 in captive supplies of livestock by packers (i.e., control or ownership of livestock more
 than 14 days prior to slaughter) have raised particular concerns for many industry
 participants. The study was completed in early 2007, and the results are being used in
 discussions about policy changes that are needed to address whether use of particular
 methods of procuring livestock by packers has adverse effects on the livestock and meat
 industries. As part of analyzing the broad range of economic effects of AMAs, we investi-
 gated how prices and price risk vary across AMAs (Muth et al., 2005, 2007).
 In this article, price risk is defined to mean the variances of prices across AMAs when
 controlling for the characteristics of the cattle lot and plant-specific effects.1 Information
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 1 An alternative definition of price risk could be based on the likelihood of receiving a lower price for fed cattle sold under
 particular marketing arrangements as compared with the price that could have been received using a different marketing
 arrangement. However, it is infeasible to determine the relevant marketing arrangement for making the comparison on every
 transaction.
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 on differences in prices and price risk increases transparency in the market and may
 improve market efficiency. Our study results help explain why different producers and
 packers use different AMAs.
 The primary types of marketing arrangements used for sales of fed cattle to packers
 can be categorized as cash market arrangements and AMAs. Cash market arrangements
 include:
 ■ auction barn sales, including video and electronic auction sales;
 ■ use of dealers and brokers; and
 ■ direct trade, which is an individual negotiation between a buyer and seller.
 In contrast, AMAs include:
 ■ forward contracts for the future purchase of a specified quantity of cattle two
 or more weeks in the future,
 ■ marketing agreements for the future purchase of cattle under a long-term
 ongoing arrangement, and
 ■ packer ownership in which the packer owns the cattle two or more weeks prior
 to slaughter.
 In addition to these key types of arrangements, the producer can own a small number
 of cattle, can custom slaughter, and can market the resulting beef products. Prices
 under most cash market arrangements are determined immediately through bidding or
 negotiation. In contrast, prices under forward contracts and marketing agreements and
 some direct trade transactions are based on some type of formula. Prices under packer
 ownership are based on an internal transfer pricing method, which is often established
 through a publicly reported market price (Muth et al., 2007).
 In theory, risk-averse cattle producers may be willing to accept lower prices for cattle
 under an AMA, all else equal, because participation in an AMA ensures market access
 and reduces a number of uncertainties, including whether a buyer is available to
 purchase cattle when they are ready for slaughter. Conversely, beef packers may be
 willing to pay higher prices for cattle under AMAs because AMAs ensure they will have
 cattle supplies needed to run the plant at a higher capacity utilization rate and they will
 have the necessary quality of cattle to meet buyer requirements for beef products. In
 some cases, however, the transactions costs involved in negotiating and setting up AMAs,
 particularly for smaller producers, may prevent market participants from entering into
 AMAs. Yet in the end, whether prices are higher or lower under AMAs is an empirical
 question.
 The purpose of this study is to analyze differences in prices and price risk across
 AMAs used for the purchase of fed cattle by beef packers, while controlling for other
 factors affecting these differences. In contrast to previous studies using ordinary least
 squares (OLS) estimation, our methodology estimates differences in price risk together
 with price levels, and accounts for the fact that prices of transactions within weeks and
 across nearby weeks are correlated. Analyses failing to account for the correlation
 within and across weeks may result in misleading inferences. Accordingly, this research
 provides suggestions about how transaction price models can be better specified and
 estimated.
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 The results of this study may help fed cattle producers decide which types of
 marketing arrangements to use to sell fed cattle to beef packers. Specifically, the results
 indicate which types of arrangements have offered the highest prices and lowest
 variance of prices for a given level of quality over the time period of the data analyzed.
 While mandatory price reporting (MPR) has greatly increased the transparency of prices
 in the industry, these data do not provide a means of adjusting for differences in quality
 across individual transactions or for analyzing price risk across individual transactions.
 Furthermore, these results contribute to policy discussions regarding the economic
 benefits of AM As.
 Previous Literature
 Previous studies have analyzed the effects of using different types of marketing arrange-
 ments on transaction prices for fed cattle, but, in most cases, they focus on the effect of
 captive supplies on cash market prices rather than on the differences in prices across
 types of marketing arrangements (e.g., Elam, 1992; Schroeder et al., 1993; Ward,
 Koontz, and Schroeder, 1998; Schroeter and Azzam, 1999, 2003). While the empirical
 research, on balance, suggests an inverse relationship between captive supplies and
 cash-market prices, establishing a causal link has been elusive (Xia and Sexton, 2004).
 According to Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998), removing a share of cattle from the
 cash market affects both supply and demand in the cash market. In a competitive
 market, the effect on price is ambiguous, because it depends on the relative magnitude
 of the shifts, which is related to the functional forms of demand and supply
 Previous studies that have examined differences in prices across types of marketing
 arrangements used for fed cattle include Williams et al. (1996); Ward, Koontz, and
 Schroeder (1998); and Schroeter and Azzam (1999). These models are akin to hedonic
 pricing models in the sense that the price of the product (fed cattle) is modeled as a
 function of its attributes to determine the implicit prices of various quality products
 (Rosen, 1974). However, in addition to measures of product attributes, binary variables
 representing the type of marketing arrangement were also included in the models.
 Earlier hedonic models of fed cattle prices did not include variables representing the
 range of marketing arrangements used (e.g., Ward, 1992; Schroeder, 1997) but did
 provide guidance on the types of quality measures or other variables that are important
 in explaining differences in fed cattle prices.
 The model developed by Williams et al. (1996) expresses the average delivered live-
 weight cost of fed cattle as a function of the type of marketing arrangement, lot
 characteristics (e.g., number of head and yield grade), plant characteristics (e.g.,
 capacity), market structure variables (e.g., regional Herfindahl index), quarterly dummy
 variables, and output price for beef. Their analysis was conducted as part of the 1996
 congressionally mandated study of market concentration in the meat packing industry.
 The data set included 23 million head of cattle in 182,000 sale lots purchased by 43
 plants from April 5, 1992 through April 3, 1993. Only lots with 35 head or more were
 included in the data set. Results of OLS regression indicated that relative to cash
 market transactions, prices for cattle sold through forward contracts and transferred
 under packer ownership were lower, and prices for cattle sold through marketing
 agreements were higher. However, the differences in prices were at most $0.02 per
 pound liveweight and were typically much less than $0.01 per pound. The results were
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 similar when the model was reestimated separately for three regions of the country
 (states in the High Plains, West, and Midwest).
 Using the same data set as Williams et al. (1996), the model estimated by Ward,
 Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) included 16.5 million cattle in 140,000 sale lots purchased
 by 28 plants. Their model specified the purchase price for cattle on a carcass weight
 basis as a function of type of marketing arrangement, reported market prices (e.g., boxed
 beef cut-out value and the live cattle futures price), lot characteristics (e.g., weight,
 number of head, and yield grade), trend variables, plant binary variables, and other
 variables. Results of OLS regression revealed that relative to cash market transactions,
 carcass weight prices for fed cattle were slightly higher for marketing agreement cattle
 ($0.10 per cwt), much lower for forward contract cattle ($3.16 per cwt), but not signifi-
 cantly different for packer-fed cattle.
 Finally, in their 1999 analysis, Schroeter and Azzam employed a later but more
 specialized data set for four plants in the Texas panhandle region over the period
 February 1995 through mid-May 1996. The analysis included information on every lot
 of cattle over 35 head purchased by four plants over the time period of the data set
 (33,000 sale lots). The model specified the purchase price for cattle in dollars per pound
 carcass weight basis as a function of binary variables indicating the plant and market-
 ing method used, lot characteristics (e.g., number of head, yield quality grade, yield
 grade, and steer versus heifer composition), distance shipped, and other variables. OLS
 regression results found premiums paid for marketing agreement cattle relative to cash
 market cattle of $0.52 to $2.26 per cwt and premiums paid for forward contract cattle
 relative to cash market cattle of $2.00 to $2.46 per cwt with the exception of one plant
 for which the forward contract variable coefficient was not significantly different from
 zero. Thus, compared to the earlier investigations, the estimated price differences are
 substantially larger and the difference for forward contract cattle has the opposite sign.
 The previous works described above assumed prices were (conditionally) uncorrelated
 across transactions and overlooked the possible correlation of prices within weeks and
 across nearby weeks; consequently, the inferences they drew may be misleading.
 Moreover, smaller size lots were not included in the data sets used for those analyses,
 which likely excluded a substantial number of cash market transactions, and hence may
 have reduced the representativeness of the results. With the specific objective of
 addressing these shortcomings, the model developed and estimated in the following
 sections accounts for the within-week and across-week correlation of prices, includes all
 lots of six or more cattle, differentiates between auction sales and other types of cash
 market sales, and uses a recent data set collected for the 2007 Grain Inspection, Packer
 and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) Livestock and Meat Marketing Study. In
 addition to taking into account the correlation of prices, the results of modeling the error
 structure provide useful information about the differences in price risk across marketing
 arrangements.
 Fed Cattle Transactions Data
 The data used for our analysis represent all fed cattle purchase transactions for 29 of
 the largest beef packing plants in the United States from October 2002 through March
 2005. These 29 plants are owned by 10 individual companies with most but not all
 companies owning multiple plants. The data were collected by RTI International under
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 contract with GIPSA in the spring of 2006. Because of their highly confidential nature,
 the data were collected and maintained under the provisions of the Confidential
 Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of 2002.2 Data collected
 under CIPSEA can be used only for statistical analysis purposes and cannot be used for
 investigations. Furthermore, results of analyses cannot reveal plant- or company-
 specific information. The contents of the data set and frequency of AMA use are
 described below.
 Contents of the Data Set
 The data set includes 591,000 lots of beef and dairy breed fed cattle averaging 100 cattle
 per lot for a total of 58 million head of cattle. By region, the data set comprises the
 following:
 ■ Cornbelt/Northeast region (IA, IL, MI, MN, PA, WI)- five plants that bought
 4.5 million head of cattle in 98,000 lots;
 ■ High Plains region (CO, KS, NE, TX)- 17 plants that bought 48.5 million
 head of cattle in 430,000 lots;
 ■ West region (AZ, CA, ID, UT, WA)- seven plants that bought 5. 1 million head
 of cattle in 66,000 lots.
 The volume of cattle in the data set represents approximately 85% of the fed cattle
 slaughtered in the United States during the October 2002 through March 2005 time
 period based on U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) data [USDA/National Agricul-
 tural Statistics Service (NASS)]. The data represent an interesting time period in the
 fed cattle industry because of the disruptions in the market that occurred first in May
 2003, when the initial discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was made
 in Canada, and the border was closed to live cattle and beef imports into the United
 States. Then, in December 2003, the first discovery of BSE was made in the United
 States; exports of beef from the United States were banned, and many consumers
 decreased their beef consumption. Thus, considerable variation occurs in the baseline
 market conditions within this data set, including periods of relatively low and relatively
 high cattle supplies.
 The variables in the data set include location of the plant, transaction dates, seller
 information, number of cattle in the lot, costs of the lot, weight measures (e.g., live-
 weight and carcass weight), characteristics of the cattle sold (quality grade, yield grade,
 and other quality measures), and characteristics of the marketing arrangement used.
 Fed cattle purchase lots typically range from 10 to 200 cattle per lot.3 Within an indi-
 vidual lot, the quality and characteristics of cattle may vary substantially depending on
 breed, distribution of steers versus heifers, whether any cattle are culled cows or bulls,
 weight range, quality grade, and yield grade. To analyze differences in transaction
 prices, it is therefore necessary to adjust for differences in the composition and quality
 of the lot.
 2 The text of the public law can be found online at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oss/CIPSEA.pdf.
 3 Smaller lots of cattle are typically off-quality cattle that are not quality graded.
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 The fed cattle prices in the data set represent the total cost to the packer for each lot
 of cattle. The total cost of a lot includes the cost of the cattle in the lot, shipping costs
 (which may be paid by the packer or by the producer), sales commission costs, miscel-
 laneous costs (e.g., feed), and price adjustments for quality. We used the per lot total
 cost to compute the carcass weight price per pound by dividing the total cost by the total
 carcass weight of each lot. Because of substantial variation in reporting of costs by
 packers, we used the total costs of the lot rather than the cattle cost to compute aver-
 ages. Cattle cost typically comprises 97% to 99% of the total cost of the lot. Plant-level
 binary variables are included in the analysis to allow for differences in the accounting
 and reporting of the total cost of each lot across companies in the data set. To eliminate
 odd lots that are not representative of typical transactions, we excluded transactions
 with prices below $0.86 and above $1.98 per pound carcass weight. These values were
 determined by taking $0.10 below the minimum and $0.10 above the maximum price
 ranges reported by MPR over the time period of the data. This data preparation step
 eliminated approximately 0.03% of the transactions in the data set.
 Frequency of Marketing Arrangement Use for Fed Cattle
 Table 1 provides a summary of the numbers of lots and transactions for each of the
 major types of marketing arrangements. For confidentiality reasons, auction barn sales
 are combined with the use of brokers and dealers, and the packer ownership category
 is combined with other miscellaneous types. Cash market transactions represent 61.7%
 of the head sold over the October 2002 through March 2005 time period. Marketing
 agreements were the primary AMA, representing 28.8% of the head sold. Packer owner-
 ship, which is combined with the miscellaneous other category, represents less than 5%
 of the head sold, and forward contracts represent 4.5% of head sold. Based on the
 differences in the percentages of lots versus head, auction sale lots tended to be smaller
 than average, and marketing agreement and forward contract lots tended to be some-
 what larger than average.
 In comparison to these estimates, Williams et al. (1996) found that for the 1992-1993
 time period of their data, 82.3% of fed cattle lots were purchased on the cash market, 8%
 were purchased using a marketing agreement, 7% were purchased using a forward
 contract, and 2.7% were packer fed. Using data from the same time period, Ward,
 Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) did not report overall percentages of transactions by type
 of marketing arrangement, but they indicated that, on average, for each 28-day period
 forward from the transactions date, 5.2% of fed cattle were available under marketing
 agreements, 5.8% were available under forward contracts, and 5.7% were under packer
 ownership. Thus, the share of cattle sold through marketing agreements increased
 substantially, while the use of the cash market declined compared to the time period
 included in our analysis. While these trends are also evident in the 1995-1996 data used
 by Schroeter and Azzam (1999), the percentages are not directly comparable because
 their data represent only four plants in Texas.4
 4 The specific estimates for four Texas plants in Schroeter and Azzam (1999) are 71.3% cash market, 21% marketing agree-
 ments, 5.2% forward contract, and 2.5% packer owned.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:30:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1 24 April 2008 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 Table 1. Summary of Fed Cattle Purchase Methods, October 2002-March 2005
 Number Percent Number Percent
 of of Lots of of Head
 Purchase Method Lots (%) Head (%)
 Auction Barns, Dealers, and Brokers 44,237 7.5 2,426,488 4.2
 Direct Trade 338,254 57.2 33,396,016 57.5
 Forward Contract 23,047 3.9 2,626,217 4.5
 Marketing Agreement 158,705 26.8 16,748,315 28.8
 Packer Fed/Owned, Other, or Missing 27,167 4.6 2,869,405 5.0
 Total 591,410 100.0 58,066,441 100.0
 Model Development
 We used a parsimonious reduced-form model to analyze how purchase prices for fed cattle
 vary among different types of marketing arrangements for cattle of similar quality. The
 intention of the model is to provide information on the association between use of
 marketing arrangements and fed cattle prices. However, because of the reduced-form
 nature of the model, we are unable to draw conclusions regarding a possible causality
 relationship.
 The complete model for estimating price differences and modeling the structure of the
 error term for capturing differences in price risk and the interdependencies in the data
 is specified as follows:
 (1) PRICE ti = ß0 + ß^AMA^ + ß2CATTLE_CHti
 + $3d_beefcattleti *D_AMAÍ¿
 + ß4D_PLANT£i + ßsD.MONTH, + utl ,
 (2) uü = vt + *ti >
 o2v if t = s,
 (3) Cov(uíf!;s) = < po' if 't-s' =1,
 0 if 't -s' >1,
 and
 (4) Var(i¿í¿) = exp(Ô0 + 01D_AMA¿¿ + 02CATTLE_CHÍ¿
 + 63d_beefcattlet¿*D_AMAt¿
 + 04D_MONTH¿ + cti)9
 where t, s = 1, ..., T indexes delivery week for each lot of fed cattle, and i = 1, ..., It
 indexes transactions (i.e., fed cattle lots purchased by packers) with delivery date in
 week t.
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 In equation (1), PRICEti is the transaction price for each lot on a per pound carcass
 weight basis, ß is a vector of parameters to estimate, and uti is a random error term. In
 addition, D_AMA^ is a vector of binary variables indicating the type of marketing
 arrangement used for purchase of the lot, including direct trade {d_directtif (as the base
 group), auction barns (d_auctionti), forward contracts (d_forwardti), packer-owned and
 other arrangements (d_packert¿), and marketing agreements (d_marketingti).
 CATTLE_CHÍ¿ is a vector of cattle characteristics, including whether the fed cattle
 are a beef or dairy breed (d_beefcattleti), the number of head in the lot (number ofheadti ),
 the percentage of Yield Grade 4 or 5 cattle in the lot (yg45_pctti), the percentage of cattle
 with Quality Grade of Prime or Choice in the lot (primechoice_pctti), the percentage of
 cattle that were classified as heavyweight or lightweight in the lot according to the def-
 inition of heavyweight or lightweight used by each individual packer (outweight_pctti),
 and the percentage of cattle that were eligible for a branded or a certification program
 in the lot (branded_pctti). All of these "characteristics" variables measure different
 aspects of quality of the lot of fed cattle. We also include the interaction term of
 d_beefcattleti*D_AMAti so that the price premium/discount associated with each
 marketing arrangement is allowed to be different for beef cattle and dairy cattle (fed
 dairy steers).
 Finally, we also incorporated 28 plant binary variables (D_PLANTÍ¿) to control for
 the plant-level unobserved fixed effects, such as location, installed capital equipment,
 and type of accounting system, and 29 binary variables to identify the year and month
 in which the cattle were slaughtered (D_MONTHt).6 The monthly binary variables
 control for differences in market conditions, seasonality, trends, and other possible
 unobserved effects related to each month. In particular, these monthly binary variables
 help control for the effect of the market disruptions that occurred as a result of the BSE
 discoveries in Canada and the United States during this period.7
 Table 2 provides the definitions, means, standard deviations, minimums, and maxi-
 mums of the variables included in the model, with the exception of the plant and
 monthly binary variables. In addition to the percentages of cattle lots sold using each
 type of marketing arrangement, the summary statistics also reveal that 78% of the lots
 are primarily beef breed cattle (and thus 22% of the lots are primarily fed dairy breed
 cattle), and that an average lot has 99 head of cattle, 64% of Prime or Choice grade
 cattle, 33% heavyweight or lightweight (i.e., outside of the packer's desired weight range)
 cattle, and 19% of cattle eligible for branded or certification programs.
 Equation (2) decomposes the error term uti into two components: a transaction-specific
 random error term, eti, and an unobserved weekly effect, vt, which is constant for all
 transactions with delivery date in week t. The unobserved weekly effect could include,
 for example, announcements regarding foreign trade of cattle and beef that may
 temporarily decrease the supply of cattle or decrease the demand for U.S. beef, extreme
 5 Transactions through dealers or brokers are combined with the transactions through direct trade because they account
 for a very small fraction of the total transactions (less than 1%) and are another type of cash market purchase.
 For example, binary variable D_MONTH1 has a value of one for October 2002, and D_M0NTH3Q has a value of one for
 March 2005.
 Note that this specification differs from Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) in that it does not include the set of market
 prices - boxed beef prices, beef by-product prices, live cattle futures prices, and lagged cash market prices. Instead, we include
 monthly dummy variables to account for current market conditions and thus avoid multicollinearity associated with including
 these variables.
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 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Price Difference Model
 for Fed Cattle Purchase Transactions, October 2002-March 2005
 Std.
 Variable Definition Mean Dev. Min. Max.
 price Transaction price in $/pound
 carcass weight 1.31 0.14 0.86 1.98
 d_jdirect Direct trade purchase
 (l=yes,0 = no) 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
 deduction Auction purchase (1 = yes, 0 = no) Da D 0.00 1.00
 d_forward Forward contract purchase
 (l = yes,0 = no) 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
 d_packer Packer-owned procurement
 (l=yes,0 = no) D D 0.00 1.00
 d_marketing Marketing agreement procurement
 (l=yes,0 = no) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
 djbeefcattle Mostly beef breed cattle in the lot
 (l=yes, 0 = no) 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00
 numberofhead Number of head in the lot (100s) 0.99 0.89 0.06 15.21
 yg45_pct % Yield Grade 4 or 5 cattle in the lot 0.08 0.10 0.00 1.00
 primechoice^pct % Prime or Choice cattle in the lot 0.64 0.24 0.00 1.00
 outweight_pct % heavyweight or lightweight cattle
 in the lot 0.33 0.37 0.00 1.00
 branded^pct % cattle eligible for branded or
 certification program in the lot 0.19 0.23 0.00 1.00
 a D indicates results suppressed to maintain confidentiality.
 weather events that temporarily reduce the ability to deliver cattle to slaughter plants,
 and immigration labor raids that temporarily reduce the ability of slaughter plants to
 operate. We assume vt and zti are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and
 uncorrelated with each other. We separately model the weekly effect in the error term
 because the U.S. fed cattle market is generally a weekly market (i.e., packers arrange
 their procurement and production activities week by week).
 Both the covariance in equation (3) and the variance in equation (4) are conditional
 on the explanatory variables in equation (1). The structure of equations (3) and (4) is
 intended to capture two potential features of the high-frequency data used. First,
 transaction prices (conditional on the explanatory variables) may be correlated within
 the same week and across neighboring weeks, even though we have controlled for the
 monthly fixed effects. Second, the variance of transaction prices (conditional on the
 explanatory variables) may vary over time, by AMA choice, or by some other explan-
 atory variables - i.e., we may have a heteroskedasticity problem.
 Equation (3) assumes that the conditional covariance of prices between any two trans-
 actions delivered in the same week is o2, the conditional covariance of prices between
 two transactions delivered in neighboring weeks is po2, and the conditional covariance
 of transaction prices is zero otherwise. Therefore, equation (3) reflects an autoregressive
 structure across weeks as well as a random-effect structure within a week in the model's
 error term. Equation (4) assumes that the variance of transaction prices depends on the
 choice of marketing arrangement, cattle characteristics, and delivery year and month.
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 If the correlation within and across weeks or heteroskedasticity exists but we failed to
 model them, our inferences would be invalid.
 The parameters in equation (4) are also of interest because they show how price vari-
 ance is correlated with the explanatory variables, and price variance is used as a measure
 of price risk in our model. Equation (4) defines what we mean by price risk (i.e., the differ-
 ence between the observed transaction price and the predicted transaction price from the
 mean equation). A large number of variables in equation (1) explain the systematic
 variation in transaction prices across lots. The unexplained variation in price is modeled
 in equation (4) and can be associated with characteristics of each transaction, including
 the marketing method. This measure of risk is short term and similar to basis risk.
 In the model described by equations (l)-(4) we are particularly interested in the
 parameters ß1? ß3, ô2, and ô3. The $1 and ß3 parameters indicate the average price
 differences associated with AMAs, holding other explanatory variables fixed. The ôx and
 ô3 parameters indicate the differences in price variance associated with AMAs, holding
 CATTLE_CH¿. and D.MONTH, fixed.
 Prior to estimating the complete model, we tested the following three null hypotheses
 for the existence of heteroskedasticity and/or correlation in the error term:
 ■ Hypothesis 1. Ho: ôx = ô2 = ô3 = ô4 = 0 vs. H^ Ho not true;
 ■ Hypothesis 2. Ho: o2v = 0 vs. Ht: o2v > 0;
 ■ Hypothesis 3. Ho: po^ = 0 vs. Hx: po^ > 0.
 If the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is not rejected, we would not have to model
 heteroskedasticity. If the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 is not rejected, we would not
 have to model the price correlation among transactions within the same week. If the
 null hypothesis for hypothesis 3 is not rejected, we would not have to model the price
 correlation between neighboring weeks. The following steps were conducted to test the
 three hypotheses:
 1. Estimate equation (1) by OLS, which yields the residuals {uti: t = 1,...,T; i = l,...,/¿}.
 2. To test null hypothesis 1, regress Iog(z2^) on the regressors in equation (4) to obtain
 estimates of ô, and use an F-test to test the joint significance of the regressors.
 3. Estimate o% by computing
 V t-' i*j ) ' t-i )
 estimate the variance of o* by computing
 ^4¿£(VV2i/Í£W-i)/2Í-¿t ) ) V t-' i*j ) 't-i )
 and then use a ¿-test to test null hypothesis 2:
 t=ô2v/JV(ô2v).
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 4. Estimate po2 by computing
 ( T-l It /<+1 ' ( T-l )
 estimate the variance of fj by computing
 It h*' ' T-l '
 EEE««W / EvJ-tf«
 í=i ¿=i >i ; ¿=i y
 and then use a ¿-test to test null hypothesis 3:
 Each of the three null hypotheses is rejected at the 1% significance level. The esti-
 mates of o2 and p are reported at the bottom of table 3. The results of these tests support
 modeling both heteroskedasticity and correlation in the error term. This dependence in
 the error terms has not been considered in previous research using transaction prices
 and suggests the statistical significance of some of those previous findings may be over-
 stated.
 Estimation Results
 Equation (1) was estimated using OLS. The estimates for the parameters are reported
 in the second column of table 3, with standard errors in column 3. In addition, the esti-
 mated coefficients and standard errors for the heteroskedasticity model, ô, are reported
 in columns 4 and 5. The variance of ß in equation (1) is estimated by computing V"(ß) =
 (X'X)-1X'QX(X'X)-1, where X = [X^,...,^,^,...^^, ...,X^,...,Xy , with
 Xti = [l, D_AMA¿¿, CATTLE_CH¿¿, d_beefcattleti, D.MONTHJ,
 and Û is the estimated variance of the vector of error term
 - Í V
 u - -[m11,...,i¿1/i, u21, ...,u2j2, ...,uT1, ...,uTIt'




 and its (k, I) element Q¿ l equals cov(ut¿, usj), where
 k = i and l=jift=s = l,
 t-i
 k = ^2 Im+i and I = j if t > 1 and s = 1,
 m = l
 s-1
 k = i and I = ^2 Im+j ^t ^1 and s > 1, and
 m = l
 t-l s-1
 k = Y,Im+i and l=Y,Im+JÍít>1 and S>1'
 m = l m = l
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 Table 3. Parameter Estimates for the Price Difference Models of Fed Cattle
 Purchase Transactions, October 2002-March 2005
 Price Log(var(u))
 Variable8 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
 deduction 0.016 0.0011 0.92 0.053
 d_ forward -0.047 0.0008 0.56 0.025
 d^packer -0.012 0.0017 -0.32 0.073
 d_marketing -0.006 0.0005 -0.22 0.013
 djbeefcattle 0.027 0.0003 -0.16 0.010
 d_beefcattle* deduction 0.093 0.0016 0.54 0.055
 djbeefcattle *d_ forward -0.00002b 0.0008 0.52 0.032
 d_beefcattle*d_packer 0.013 0.0018 0.22 0.075
 djbeefcattle *d_marketing 0.012 0.0004 0.02 b 0.016
 numberofhead 0.005 0.0001 -0.10 0.004
 yg45_pct -0.073 0.0010 0.70 0.033 :
 primechoice_pct 0.062 0.0005 -0.23 0.012
 outweight_pct -0.021 0.0005 0.31 0.009
 branded_pct 0.027 0.0006 -0.16 0.014
 a* 0.00072
 p 0.27
 No. of Observations (lots) 571,608 571,608
 R2 0.7744 0.1260
 a Other variables not reported here include an intercept, monthly binary variables, and plant binary variables.
 b Coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level. All other variables are significant at the 5% level.
 Thus,
 exp(X¿¿6) if t = s, i =j,
 „ _ à2v if t=s9i*j,
 kil~ ?% if |f-s|=l,
 0 otherwise.
 We use OLS rather than the more efficient feasible generalized least squares (FGLS)
 or maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) for three reasons. First, OLS is more robust
 to model specification than FGLS or MLE. MLE requires specifying the joint distribu-
 tion of error term, which means we would have to impose a much stronger assumption
 on the error term than our current version. FGLS imposes a weaker assumption than
 MLE; however, it would yield inconsistent estimates for the coefficients if the error
 structure is misspecified. Second, both MLE and FGLS are computationally difficult
 because of the size of the data set and the complexity of the error structure.8 Third,
 efficiency is not a substantial concern here given our large sample size. The results are
 described in more detail below.
 8 Estimation of the model using FGLS would require inverting a 571,608 x 571,608 matrix.
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 Price Difference Equation Results
 The results of estimation suggest that, while holding other explanatory variables fixed,
 (a) beef breed direct trade cattle were priced $0.027 per pound higher than dairy breed
 direct trade cattle, (ò) cattle with higher yield grades or higher quality grades received
 a higher average price, (c) a 10% increase in cattle eligible for product branding in a lot
 was associated with a $0.027 per pound higher average price, and (d) the prices of light-
 weight or heavyweight cattle were discounted. In addition, average prices were slightly
 higher for larger cattle lots. These differences are relative to an average price of $1.31
 per pound carcass weight for the transactions in the data set and indicate the average
 magnitude of premiums and discounts being paid to producers.
 Tables 4 and 5 summarize the estimated average price differences among AMAs for
 beef cattle and dairy cattle, respectively. Standard errors were estimated as described
 by equations (2)-(4). All the differences were individually significant at the 5% level,
 based on Wald tests. The average prices were closest among the direct trade, marketing
 agreement, and packer-owned transactions, with the estimated differences ranging from
 $0.001 to $0.012 per pound carcass weight. These estimates are relatively similar to the
 estimates of $0.001 for marketing agreement and $0.0001 for packer-owned transactions
 relative to all cash market transactions reported by Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder
 (1998). The auction barn transaction price was estimated to be about $0.109 higher for
 beef breed cattle (see table 4) and $0.016 higher for dairy breed cattle (see table 5) than
 for the corresponding direct trade cattle, although both direct trade and auctions are cash
 market procurement methods. Also (again similar to Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder),
 transaction prices associated with forward contract transactions were the lowest among
 all the procurement methods. This result may suggest that farmers who choose forward
 contracts were willing to give up some revenue to secure market access and fix the price
 at least two weeks before delivery.
 The findings that auction barn prices were the highest and forward contract prices
 were the lowest could be due, in part, to the unique time period of the analysis, including
 the stage of the cattle cycle and the closure of the border with Canada after the discovery
 of BSE in May 2003. Our model compares the prices among procurement methods for
 the cattle delivered in the same month but does not control for the pricing dates related
 to individual transactions. Transaction prices are correlated with the expectation of
 market conditions at the delivery date based on the information available at the pricing
 date. Pricing dates and delivery dates systematically differed among procurement
 methods. According to the portion of the data for which pricing dates were available
 (approximately 40% of the records), on average, forward contract cattle were priced 12
 days ahead of delivery date, direct trade cattle were priced six days ahead, and auction
 barn cattle were priced only two days ahead of the kill date.9 Consider a forward
 contract lot and an auction barn lot that are delivered at the same time. If a positive
 market shock (e.g., the closure of the border with Canada) occurred before the pricing
 time of auction barn cattle but was not expected at the time when forward contract
 cattle were priced, then forward contract cattle would be priced lower than auction barn
 cattle because of the unexpected random market shock.
 9 Note that the pricing date is different from the date on which the contract was signed. For example, forward contracts
 are typically signed a few months prior to slaughter, but prices may be set according to a formula closer to the slaughter date
 and possibly after the slaughter date, if valuation is based on a carcass weight using a grid.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:30:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Muth et al Prices and Price Risk for Fed Cattle 1 3 1
 Table 4. Estimated Average Price Differences Among AMAs for Fed Beef Cattle
 Purchase Transactions, October 2002-March 2005 ($/lb. carcass weight)
 Direct Trade & Forward Marketing Packer
 Marketing Arrangement Auction Dealer/Broker Contract Agreement Owned
 Auction - 0.109 0.156 0.103 0.108
 Direct Trade & Dealer/Broker -0.109 - 0.047 -0.006 -0.001
 Forward Contract -0.156 -0.047 - -0.053 -0.048
 Marketing Agreement -0.103 0.006 0.053 - 0.005
 Packer Owned -0.108 0.001 0.048 -0.005 -
 Table 5. Estimated Average Price Differences Among AMAs for Dairy Breed Fed
 Cattle Purchase Transactions, October 2002-March 2005 ($/lb. carcass weight)
 Direct Trade & Forward Marketing Packer
 Marketing Arrangement Auction Dealer/Broker Contract Agreement Owned
 Auction - 0.016 0.063 0.022 0.028
 Direct Trade & Dealer/Broker -0.016 - 0.047 0.006 0.012
 Forward Contract -0.063 -0.047 - -0.041 -0.035
 Marketing Agreement -0.022 -0.006 0.041 - 0.006
 Packer Owned -0.028 -0.012 0.035 -0.006 -
 Somewhat similar conditions existed for the time period of the data analyzed by Ward,
 Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) in that cattle prices rose because of extreme weather
 conditions in the winter of 1992, resulting in limited cattle supplies.10 If the time period
 represented in the data were long enough, a positive shock would not bias the estima-
 tion results because positive shocks should be offset by negative shocks in the long run.
 However, this may not be true in this case because the represented time period is
 relatively short. Specifically, if the unexpected market shock were systematically
 positive during our represented period, failing to control for market expectations at the
 pricing date would bias the estimates of price differences among procurement methods.
 Nevertheless, we believe the effect of this bias is limited, because the largest average
 pricing date difference among procurement methods is a maximum of 12 days. To
 investigate the possible bias in the results due to the unique time period of analysis, we
 examined the average two- week price difference in the Nebraska cash market for steers.
 This difference was found to be both economically and statistically insignificant (the
 mean value of the difference is $0.0018 per pound dressed weight, and thep-value of the
 ¿-test is 0.78). Therefore, we expect the bias, if it exists, is small.
 The primary findings of the price difference model is that marketing agreement,
 packer-owned, and negotiated cash cattle are all priced at similar levels. While dairy
 breed fed cattle sold under a marketing agreement are discounted slightly relative to
 direct trade, the opposite occurs for beef breed fed cattle. Although price differences may
 be a reason for using particular AMAs, other reasons, such as allowing for market access,
 also affect the decision to use AMAs.
 10 In contrast, Schroeter and Azzam (1999) found that forward contract prices were higher relative to cash market prices
 because prices were trending downward during the time period of their analysis.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Tue, 20 Dec 2016 16:30:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1 32 April 2008 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 Heteroskedasticity Equation Results
 The primary conclusions regarding price risk from the estimated coefficients in the
 fourth column of table 3 indicate that compared with direct trade, the price variances
 were much higher for auction barn transactions and forward contracts and lower for
 packer-owned and marketing agreement transactions, holding cattle characteristics
 (CATTLE_CHÍ¿) and month of sale (D_MONTH¿) fixed. In comparing these coefficients,
 variances of prices clearly do not represent all types of risk faced by market participants.
 In particular, producers using forward contracts may face higher price risk if market
 conditions change after negotiating the contract, but they may also face lower revenue
 risk, they may have secured market access, and they may have the ability to obtain
 better financing terms with lenders.
 Other parameter estimates suggest that price variances were (a) lower for fed beef
 cattle than fed dairy cattle, (6) lower for cattle that are eligible for a branded and certifi-
 cation program, (c) lower for cattle of higher yield grade (i.e., a lower yield grade number)
 and quality grade, (d) lower for cattle within the regular weight range, and (e) lower
 for cattle sold in large lots. To summarize, cattle possessing desirable characteristics
 obtained not only higher average prices but also secured lower price risk.
 The estimated differences (percentage higher or lower) in price variance among
 marketing arrangements for fed beef cattle and for fed dairy cattle are reported in tables
 6 and 7, respectively. All the difference estimates were individually significant at the
 5% level based on Wald tests. Among the five marketing arrangement categories, auction
 barn transactions were associated with the highest average price but also the highest
 price risk, even after accounting for systematic factors such as quality and month. Thus,
 it appears that selling through auction barns should appeal more to less risk-averse
 cattle feeders.11 In addition, prices under forward contracts were more risky than direct
 trade or marketing agreements because prices were lower and price risk was higher.
 In comparing auction barn transactions to forward contracts, the average price differ-
 ence ($0.156 per pound for beef cattle and $0.063 per pound for fed dairy cattle) could
 be considered a risk premium to compensate feeders who sell their cattle in auction
 barns for bearing more price risk (46% higher variance for beef cattle and 43% higher
 variance for fed dairy cattle) and for assuming more market access risk. Packer-owned
 fed dairy cattle had slightly lower average prices ($0.012 per pound carcass weight) and
 lower price variance (27% lower) than those under direct trade, while packer-owned fed
 beef cattle had slightly higher average prices ($0.001 per pound carcass weight) and
 lower price variance (10% lower) than direct trade. This result is consistent with the fact
 that internal transfer prices for packer-owned cattle usually are based on a reported
 average cash market price.
 Transactions through marketing agreements are associated with lower price risk (18%
 lower variance for fed beef cattle and 20% lower for fed dairy cattle) than those through
 direct trade. Given that average prices for marketing agreement cattle and direct trade
 cattle are very similar, and marketing agreements help secure market access while
 direct trade does not, it appears that a risk-averse feeder has less incentive to use direct
 trade when marketing agreements are available. However, marketing agreements
 11 Although less risk-averse cattle feeders may prefer use of auctions, we note that some cattle feeders may simply use
 auctions because they sell small lots of cattle that would be difficult to contract.
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 Table 6. Estimated Price Variance Differences (% higher or lower) Among
 Marketing Arrangements Used for Purchasing Fed Beef Cattle, October
 2002-March 2005
 Direct Trade & Forward Marketing Packer
 Marketing Arrangement Auction Dealer/Broker Contract Agreement Owned
 Auction 0 331 46 426 376
 Direct Trade & Dealer/Broker -77 0 -66 22 11
 Forward Contract -32 194 0 260 225
 Marketing Agreement -81 -18 -72 0 -10
 Packer Owned -79 -10 -69 11 0
 Note: The differences are computed as the price variance of each AMA listed in the left column divided by the price
 variance of each AMA listed in the top row minus one.
 Table 7. Estimated Price Variance Differences (% higher or lower) Among
 Marketing Arrangements Used for Purchasing Dairy Breed Fed Cattle, October
 2002-March 2005
 Direct Trade & Forward Marketing Packer
 Marketing Arrangement Auction Dealer/Broker Contract Agreement Owned
 Auction 0 151 43 213 246
 Direct Trade & Dealer/Broker -60 0 -43 25 38
 Forward Contract -30 75 0 118 141
 Marketing Agreement -68 -20 -54 0 11
 Packer Owned -71 -27 -59 -10 0
 Note: See footnote to table 6 above.
 require a strong bilateral relationship between feeder and packer and might not be avail-
 able for all feeders.
 From a methodological standpoint, the correlation of transaction prices within the
 week and across weeks is important. The estimates of oy2 and p in equation (3) are indi-
 vidually significant at the 1% level. The estimated average correlations of prices within
 the week and across weeks are 16% and 4.3% respectively. Thus, ignoring these correla-
 tions may result in higher levels of significance of the estimated model parameters and
 cause inferences to be misleading.
 Summary and Conclusions
 Fed cattle producers and beef packers may choose among several cash and AMAs to
 conduct transactions. Factors affecting their choices include whether prices are on aver-
 age higher, lower, or more or less volatile for each type of arrangement. We conducted
 an econometric analysis of the relationship between fed cattle transaction prices and use
 of marketing arrangements, while controlling for differences in cattle quality and
 delivery month and accounting for the within-week and across-nearby-week correlation
 in prices. The analysis used a recent data set for the October 2002 through March 2005
 time period and included sale lots of six or more cattle purchased by the 29 largest beef
 packing plants in the United States.
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 The results indicate that relative to direct trade, which is the most frequently used
 marketing arrangement for fed cattle, prices for fed cattle sold through auctions were
 higher, but also had substantially higher price risk. Prices for cattle sold under forward
 contracts or marketing arrangements or cattle transferred under packer ownership were
 all lower than cattle for direct trade, but only prices under forward contracts were more
 volatile. The results for forward contracts are likely explained by the time period of the
 analysis, in which fed cattle prices were trending upward. Also, prices under forward
 contracts are set earlier than for the other types of arrangements. Marketing agree-
 ments appeared to provide the best tradeoff between price level and price risk compared
 with direct trade, because prices were within $0.01 per pound carcass weight for both
 beef and dairy breed fed cattle but were 18% to 20% less volatile. Although use of
 marketing agreements for fed cattle has increased substantially compared to the
 previous analysis by Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998), estimated price differences
 are similar when compared to cash market transactions. However, our results break out
 separate price difference estimates for direct trade versus auction transactions, and
 show that cash market transactions are not homogeneous. Furthermore, previous
 research on fed cattle pricing has not shown the specific tradeoffs between price levels
 and price volatility that producers and packers must consider when choosing among
 types of marketing arrangements.
 Our results also revealed that larger and higher quality lots were associated with
 higher average prices and lower variances of prices. Packers are willing to pay more for
 larger lots because they reduce their transactions costs and improve scheduling of their
 operations. The quality measures used in the analysis included the percentage of cattle
 in Yield Grade 4 or 5, in Choice or Prime Quality Grade, outside of the desired weight
 range, and eligible for product branding. All measures were statistically significant,
 indicating that packers pay more for better quality cattle and have less variation in
 prices while holding fixed the type of marketing arrangement used and the month of
 purchase.
 Further analyses of these data are investigating more directly the relationship between
 the use of AMAs, which would typically be considered captive supply arrangements, and
 cash market prices (Muth et al., 2007). In particular, the questions of interest include
 whether individual packers bid less aggressively in the cash market when they have a
 higher proportion of their supplies precommitted under AMAs and whether a higher use
 of AMAs across the industry is associated with reduced cash market prices. Additional
 analyses are also investigating the direct relationship between fed cattle quality and the
 use of different types of marketing arrangements or valuation methods (i.e., liveweight,
 carcass weight with a grid, and carcass weight without a grid) (Muth et al., 2007). In
 this case, the question of interest is whether packers are using AMAs to ensure higher
 and more consistent quality of fed cattle purchases.
 [Received July 2007; final revision received January 2008.]
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